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ABSTRACT  
This study examines how UK pension fund trustees interpret the concept of their 
fiduciary duties in practice and how these interpretations may shape pension fund 
approaches to corporate stewardship and engagement as envisioned by the UK 
Stewardship Code. Using the data from 35 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 
pension fund trustees, executives, investment intermediaries and a series of round-
table discussions with pensions experts, the study uncovers interpretive pluralism of 
the concept of Fiduciary Duty in the area of pension funds. A model identifying the 
spectrum of pension fund engagement is developed, showing how different 
interpretations of fiduciary duty may be linked to various intensity and methods of 
engagement in practice. The findings help disambiguate the concept of ‘fiduciary 
duty’, highlighting the challenges of Stewardship Code application in practice. These 
insights are very relevant to the ongoing revisions of the Stewardship Code and 
further policy clarifications of the nature of fiduciary duty by the UK Financial 
Conduct Authority. This paper encourages trustees, regulators and others to consider 
closely what role pension fund trustees should have in stewardship, which may not be 
directly relevant to their fiduciary duties as trustees.  
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Institutional investors1 are said to be pivotal to two vital dimensions of modern 
capital markets, firstly for the value of public corporations they own, and secondly, 
for the financial security of savers who invest through them.  Regulators count on 
institutional investors to help police the market against the risk of either repeat 
systemic crimes and fraud or CEO pay rising. Yet, in the wake of the Financial Crisis 
of 2007-2008 institutional investors were repeatedly blamed for being part of the 
problem that lead to the market crash. In particular, their passivity, lax engagement 
and disinterest in exercising proper oversight of their investee companies were heavily 
criticized.2 In the aftermath of the crisis and the governance reviews that followed3, 
the concept of a ‘Fiduciary Duty’ was hastily (and perhaps inappropriately) put 
forward as a legal and practical platform that could guide the development of 
institutional investor practices, particularly those relating to extending the stewardship 
                                                 
1 The Code defines “institutional investors” as asset owners and asset managers with equity holdings in 
UK listed companies. Asset owners are defined in the Code to include pension funds, insurance 
companies, investment trusts and other collective investment vehicles. As the providers of capital, asset 
owners set the tone for stewardship and may influence behavioural changes that lead to better 
stewardship by asset managers and companies. Asset managers as defined as those with day-to-day 
responsibility for managing investments on behalf of the asset owners and are in a position to influence 
companies’ long-term performance through stewardship. Page 2, Para. 2 and Page 1, Para. 6. 
2 A Reisberg, 'The UK stewardship code: On the road to nowhere?' (2015) 2 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies, 217.   
3 For the overview of the development of the Stewardship Code see B. Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship 
Code's Achilles' Heel’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 1004, and Reisberg,  'The UK stewardship code: 




role vis-a-vis investee firms4. The success of this approach was dependent to a great 
extent on the large number of investors such as asset managers, insurance companies 
and pension funds to be actively engaged with the companies. From this perspective, 
the diligent exercise of shareholder stewardship5 became essential to reinforce the 
‘comply or explain’ effects of the UK Corporate Governance Code6.    
Although no longer the largest group of investors in the UK market, pension 
funds7 are considered both by scholars and policymakers to be particularly significant 
for stewardship because of their ‘patient capital’, which is designed (in theory) to 
                                                 
4  J. Hawley, A. Hoepner, K. Johnson, J. Sandberg, and E. Waitzer ‘Cambridge Handbook of 
Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty’ (2014) Cambridge University Press; Financial Reporting 
Council, The Stewardship Code, (2012) https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-
b603-3d24b2f62c5f/UK-Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf (last visited 15 April 2018), London; 
J Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making (July 2012).  
5 The Code defines “stewardship” as “For the investor, stewardship aims to promote the long-term 
success of companies in such a way that the ultimate providers of capital also prosper. For investors, 
stewardship is more than just voting. Activities may include monitoring and engaging with companies 
on matters such as strategy, performance, risk, capital structure, and corporate governance, including 
culture and remuneration. Engagement is purposeful dialogue with companies on these matters as well 
as on issues that are the immediate subject of votes at general meetings.” Code, Page 1, Para. 4. 
6 Reisberg, , 'The UK stewardship code: On the road to nowhere?' (2015) 2 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies, 217.   
7 Davies indicates that the beneficial share ownership of UK equities by pension funds has steadily 
been decreasing from the peak of 31.7% in 1993 to only 4.7% in 2012. P. Davies, ‘Shareholders in the 




generate returns for their beneficiaries over the longer term.8  However, a host of 
barriers seem to prevent all but a handful of funds9 from meeting the expectations 
placed on them as ‘owners’ of public corporations. Alongside the more obvious 
barriers such as dispersed share ownership and the associated problems of co-
ordination, management and control; free-rider problems, 10  other problems of 
diversification; rational apathy and informational deficit11 have been pointed out. The 
long chain of intermediaries from ultimate beneficial interests through to the investee 
company also represent a significant barrier to engagement.12 13 
                                                 
8 L. Ryan and M. Schneider, ‘The Antecedents of Institutional Investor Activism’ (2002) 27 Academy 
of Management 4, 554-573; S. Davis, J. Lukomnik and D. Pitt-Watson, ‘The New Capitalists: How 
Citizen Investors are Reshaping the Corporate Agenda’ (2006) Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business  
School Press; R. Martin, P. Casson and T. Nisar, ‘Investor Engagement: Investors and Management  
Practice Under Shareholder Value’ (2007) Oxford University Press; Financial Reporting Council, The 
Kay Review (2012). The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making. 
[available at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/k/12-631-kay-review-of-equity-
markets-interim-report.pdf ] 
9 It should be noted here that, if constituted as a trust the pension fund is not a separate legal person but 
only acts through its trustees. 
10 Martin, P. Casson and T. Nisar, ‘Investor Engagement: Investors and Management Practice Under 
Shareholder Value’ (2007) Oxford University Press; A. Schäfer and U. von Arx, ‘The Influence of 
Pension Funds on Corporate Governance’ (2014) 46 Applied Economics 19, 2316.  
11 Reisberg. A, 'The UK stewardship code: On the road to nowhere?' (2015) 2 Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies, 232.  
12 Wong (n 47) 408; J Rhee, ‘Short-Termism of Institutional Investors and the Double Agency Problem’ 





In the context of the FRC’s ongoing review of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code14 and the Stewardship Code (2012)15, it seems that the commitment to these 
general principles seems to be much easier to achieve at a theoretical level than in 
practice. Various commentators and regulators have asked why shareholders have not 
exercised more control over investee companies. Lord Myners (then the Financial 
Services Secretary to the Treasury) described institutional investors as “absentee 
landlords” and stated that institutional investor inactivity had contributed to what he 
termed the “ownerless corporation.”16 An OECD Report (February 2011)17 on the  
                                                                                                                                             
double-agency-problem/> A. Tilba and T. McNulty, ‘Engaged versus Disengaged Ownership: The Case 
of Pension Funds in the UK’ (2013) 21 Corporate Governance: An International Review 21(2):165-
182. 
13  A. Tilba and J. Wilson, ‘Vocabularies of Motive and Temporal Perspectives: Examples of Pension 
Fund Engagement and Disengagement’ (2017) British Journal of Management, 11.   
14 FRC, (December, 2017) Proposed Revisions to the UK Corporate Governance Code at:   
https://frc.org.uk/getattachment/f7366d6f-aa57-4134-a409-1362d220445b/;.aspx (last visited 12 March 
15 FRC, The Annual Review of Corporate Governance and Reporting 2017/2018 (October 2018) 
[available at: https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/f70e56b9-7daf-4248-a1ae-a46bad67c85e/Annual-
Review-of-CG-R-241018.pdf ]  
The UK Stewardship Code (2012) [https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b603-
3d24b2f62c5f/UK-Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf ] (last visited 30 April 2017).  
16 Lord Myners, ‘Association of Investment Companies’(April 2009), at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20091207163737/http://hmtreasury.gov.uk/speech_fsst_2104




contributing causes of the global financial crisis concluded that institutional investors 
were generally not effective in monitoring investee companies. At present, companies 
like BHS, Carillion, which has 13 pension schemes, GKN (with the hostile takeover 
bid by Melrose) British Steel/Tata, and Toys R Us, lead to questions being asked 
about the monitoring role of the pension trustees and the Pensions Regulator, 
particularly in light of increasing pension deficits and yet continuous dividend 
payments to shareholders.   
A number of scholars have begun to question the effectiveness of the UK 
Stewardship Code itself arguing that it lacks the capacity to achieve its goals.18 Active 
pension fund trustees’ involvement in corporate governance thus appears more 
assumed than demonstrated, while the motivations behind these contrasting 
approaches to equity ownership necessitate further investigation.  Despite reforms and 
continuous development of best practices in corporate governance, little attention has 
been placed specifically on the governance of pension schemes. While good pension 
scheme governance is, indeed, essential, there is a necessary precursor, that the 
purpose of the scheme and the responsibilities of the trustees be well-defined and 
                                                                                                                                             
17  OECD (2011), The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good Corporate Governance, 
Corporate Governance, page 9. 
18 B. Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code's Achilles' Heel’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 1004; D. 
Arsalidou, ‘Institutional Investors, behavioural economics and the concept of Stewardship’ (2012) 6 
Law and Financial Market Review 6, 410; Reisberg. A, 'The UK stewardship code: On the road to 
nowhere?' (2015) 2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies; Tilba. A. and Wilson, J.F. (2017). Vocabularies 
of Motive and Temporal Perspectives: Examples of Pension Fund Engagement and Disengagement.  




understood. However, there are still serious omissions in these debates, which this 
study aims to help address.  
Furthermore, pension fund trustees are legally bound by common law 
fiduciary duty, which requires trustees to proceed with prudence and to act in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries. Notwithstanding recently heightened attention and 
expectations placed on fiduciary duties, our understanding of how this central concept 
shapes pension fund trustees’19 approaches to investment is still lacking in clarity both 
in academic research and practice20. The lack of clarification around ‘fiduciary duties’ 
continues to be a topic of significant interest to the policy makers as evident from the 
ongoing Financial Conduct Authority’s discussion paper on the Duty of Care and 
potential alternative approaches21. To my knowledge, no studies have yet empirically 
investigated how pension fund trustees interpret and apply the concept of fiduciary 
duties in their investment practices and how it shapes their approach to stewardship 
and engagement.   
                                                 
19 It should be noted that in English law, a trust is not a separate legal entity from the personalities of its 
trustees. 
20 J. Sandberg, ‘(Re-)Interpreting Fiduciary Duty to Justify Socially Responsible Investment for  
Pension Funds. (2013) 21 Corporate Governance: An International Review, 436; UK Law  
Commission, 2014 Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries [available at:  
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/lc350_fiduciary_duties.pdf  (last visited 15 April  
2018)]; J. Hawley, A. Hoepner, K. Johnson, J. Sandberg, and E. Waitzer ‘Cambridge Handbook of 
Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty’ (2014) Cambridge University Press. 
21 Financial Conduct Authority (2018) Discussion paper on the duty of care and potential alternative 





This study contributes to the scarce literature on pension fund governance and 
shareholder engagement in several respects. Theoretically, this paper answers calls to 
disambiguate the concept of ‘fiduciary duty’ 22  by developing a model, which 
identifies a range of interpretations of fiduciary duty and relating them to specific 
forms and methods of pension fund stewardship and corporate engagement. This 
article reveals varying degrees of pension fund engagement and financial focus. Four 
distinct interpretations and approaches are emerging: Disengagement, Employer 
Engagement, Fund Manager Engagement and Corporate Engagement.   
These empirical findings suggest that trustees have different understandings of 
their role and of the purpose of a pension fund. The findings reveal the 
interconnection of the legal responsibilities and how trustees interpret these 
responsibilities and stewardship and engagement. More specifically, there is a distinct 
tension between trustees’ stewardship responsibilities and the exclusive focus on 
financial performance within pension funds, where stewardship seems to pull trustees 
in a different direction from what they consider to be the purpose of a pension fund 
(i.e. focusing on generating financial returns and securing retirement income, not 
fixing corporate governance problems). Ultimately, this paper contributes to the 
ongoing policy debates concerning investor stewardship and fiduciary duties within 
the investment chain by revealing challenges of using the concept of fiduciary duty as 
                                                 
22 J. Sandberg, ‘(Re-)Interpreting Fiduciary Duty to Justify Socially Responsible Investment for  
Pension Funds. (2013) 21 Corporate Governance: An International Review, 436; UK Law  
Commission, 2014 Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries [available at:  
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/lc350_fiduciary_duties.pdf  (last visited 15 April  
2018)]; J. Hawley, A. Hoepner, K. Johnson, J. Sandberg, and E. Waitzer ‘Cambridge Handbook of 




a tool of corporate governance.  In so doing, the findings raise questions about the 
levels of pension fund compliance with the Stewardship Code in the spirit that it was 
originally intended.  
The paper is structured as follows: it begins with a brief introduction of the UK 
Stewardship Code, highlighting some of the challenges of institutional compliance 
with the Code. Focusing on pension funds, this study looks at the trustee’s fiduciary 
duties as an essential but little explored concept which is closely linked to pension 
fund compliance with the Stewardship Code.  The paper then draws on the qualitative 
data and develops a spectrum of pension fund engagement, which outlines different 
forms and methods of pension fund engagement, linking them to trustees’ 
interpretations of their fiduciary duties. This model exposes not only variations in 
pension fund ownership behaviour, but also explains why such variations may exist. 
The Discussion elaborates on the contribution of this study to current corporate 
governance debates on the nature of fiduciary duty and institutional investor 
engagement. Policy Implications highlight the challenges of Stewardship Code 
application in the pension fund context and offer further clarifications on ‘fiduciary 
duty’ and how it can be applied in practice in relation to the Stewardship Code.    
THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE  
The UK has long been seen as an international leader in the development of successful 
non-statutory and voluntary guidance and codes of best practice relating to corporate 
affairs. 23  Practitioners and policymakers have been placing greater emphasis 
                                                 
23 For the historic overview of the development of these codes see B. Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship 




particularly on institutional investors to be more active in corporate governance. In the 
US this is evident from The Conference Board reports,24  whilst in the UK the recent 
financial crisis served to heighten the expectations of policy-makers that institutional 
investors should be acting as stewards and engaged owners of shares.22 In February 
2009 Sir David Walker was commissioned to review the governance of banks and 
related entities25. This review highlighted that:                                                           
 ‘while institutional investors could not have prevented the [financial] 
crisis, …with hindsight it seems clear that…board and director 
shortcomings…would have been tackled more effectively had there been 
more vigorous scrutiny and engagement by major investors acting as 
owners26   
By 2010 this pro-intervention perspective was embodied in the semi-official 
UK Stewardship Code, which consisted of seven principles very similar to the 
Institutional Shareholders’ Committee and was informally enforced on the ‘comply or 
                                                                                                                                             
and A. Tilba, (2016) Evolution of UK Corporate Ownership and Control: Governance, Complexity and 
Context. In: JF Wilson, JFS. Toms; A de Jong, E. Buchnea, ed. The Routledge Companion to Business 
(2017) History, Abington, Oxon: Routledge, 300. 
24 e.g. M. Tonello, ‘Revisiting Stock Market Short-Termism’ (2006) The Conference Board Report No.  
R-1386-06-RR.  The Conference Board is a non-partisan, global, independent business membership 
and research association working in the public interest. See https://www.conference-
board.org/about/index.cfm?id=1980. 
25 D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities: 
Final Recommendations (HM Treasury 2009), 71-72, at 
<http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_  




explain’ basis. In the same spirit, the report by Professor John Kay27 in 2012 has been 
highly critical of the way UK equity markets have been geared towards generating 
short-term investment profits. Prof. Kay emphasized the need for a shift towards long-
term and fiduciary standards 28 , necessitating loyalty and prudence within the 
investment world. Part of the financial services industry seems to have committed 
itself to do better as there were over 1600 signatories with more than EUR 60 trillion 
in assets under management as of December 2016 to the United Nations sponsored 
Principles for Responsible Investment. 29  Similarly, the directive of non-financial 
reporting by the European Union encouraged institutional investors to be active 
                                                 
27 John Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making. Final Report, 
July, 2012 [available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/2534
54/bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf (last visited 18 October 2018)]. 
28 Kay set out as one of his Principles the applicable fiduciary standard as follows: “All participants in 
the equity investment chain should observe fiduciary standards in their relationships with their clients 
and customers. Fiduciary standards require that the client’s interests are put first, that conflict of 
interest should be avoided, and that the direct and indirect costs of services provided should be 
reasonable and disclosed. These standards should not require, nor even permit, the agent to depart from 
generally prevailing standards of decent behaviour. Contractual terms should not claim to override 
these standards.” Ibid. p. 65.  
29 United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI), 2016. Signatories to the Principles 
for Responsible Investment. http://www.unpri.org/signatories/signatories/ [10 December 2017] (last 




owners, which means incorporating environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
issues within their investment strategies and practices.30   
Thus, institutional investor engagement and activism has become a desirable 
activity in public policy terms.31 However, commitment to these general principles 
seems to be much easier to achieve at a theoretical or strategic level than in daily 
operations and practices as there seems to be a variety of definitions of what 
‘Stewardship’ really means.32 The 2012 Stewardship Code was promoted at European 
Union level by the European Commission 33  but it contained no definition of 
                                                 
30 European Union (EU). Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
Information by Certain Large Undertakings and Groups. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0095  [10 December 2017] (last visited 15 
Aprl 2018); European Union (EU). 2014b. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of Long-Term Shareholder 
Engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Certain Elements of the Corporate Governance 
Statement, COM/2014/0213 final – 2014/0121 (COD). http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3Ab2014%3A213%3AFIN  [10 December 2017] (last 
visited 15 Aprl 2018). October 2014 Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-
financial and Diversity  
31 Davies, P. (2015). Shareholders in the United Kingdom. ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, nr. 
280/2015,18.   
32 Reisberg. A, 'The UK stewardship code: On the road to nowhere?' (2015) 2 Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies, 228.   
33  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee of the Regions Action Plan: European company law and corporate 




stewardship and so it was vague as to whether the Code was confined to securing 
good corporate governance in investee companies or extended to intervention to 
secure changes in managerial policy. 
The distinctive elements of stewardship behaviour involve a ‘shared sense of 
ongoing responsibility to multiple stakeholders, which affects a focus on collective 
welfare over the long term.’34 In the context of institutional investors, ‘stewardship’ is 
used as to encourage the long-term success of companies by protecting and enhancing 
the value of the firm to the ultimate benefit of an investor (Stewardship Code, 2012).   
The EU Corporate Governance Framework, Green Paper 35  suggests that 
“Shareholder engagement is generally understood as actively monitoring companies, 
engaging in a dialogue with the company’s board, and using shareholder rights, 
including voting and cooperation with other shareholders, if need be to improve the 
governance of the investee company in the interests of long-term value creation.”36 
The 2009 Walker Review of corporate governance in banks and financial companies 
suggests that “the term ‘engagement’ relates to procedures designed to ensure that 
shareholders derive value from their holdings by dealing effectively with concerns 
                                                                                                                                             
COM/2012/0740 final */, Para. 2.4 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0740). 
34 Hernandez, M. (2012). Toward an Understanding of the Psychology of Stewardship. Academy of 
Management Review, 37(2), 176.  
35 Green Paper (2011) The EU corporate governance framework /* COM(2011) 164 final  (https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52011DC0164).  




about under-performance.” 37  This includes: arrangements for monitoring investee 
companies; arrangements for meeting as appropriate with a company’s chairman or 
senior management; a strategy for intervention where judged appropriate, and policy 
on voting and voting disclosure. The UK Law Commission report on Fiduciary Duties 
of Investment Intermediaries in 2014 defines stewardship activities as including the 
monitoring of and engaging with companies on matters such as strategy, performance, 
risk, capital structure and corporate governance, including culture and remuneration.38 
All in all, the development of these ‘soft’ codes and increasing expectations on 
investors to become involved in corporate governance has consequently assumed 
certain benchmarks of success or failure to ‘comply or explain’.   
Historically, through equity ownership, pension funds represented an 
important class of institutional investors who were potentially in a position to play a 
significant role in the evolution of UK ownership.39 Subsequently, academics and 
policy makers showed great interest in pension fund engagement activities and their 
outcomes within corporate governance literature. However, whether stewardship can 
bear the weight placed upon it is not yet clear as there is a mixed empirical research of 
                                                 
37 D. Walker (2009), A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry 
Entities: Final Recommendations (HM Treasury 2009), 71-72  <http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf , para 5, 14.  
38 UK Law Commission (2014) Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/lc350_fiduciary_duties.pdf , xiv.   
39 J. Franks, C. Mayer, and S. Rossi, ‘Ownership: Evolution and Regulation’ (2005) Social Science 
Research Network, 4009; Davies, P. (2015). Shareholders in the United Kingdom. ECGI Working Paper 




both engagement and disengagement by institutional investors. 40  Most recent 
academic reviews of the current state of shareholder activism literature suggest that 
the research on shareholder engagement (both financial and social) offers conflicting 
perspectives on this topic, calling for more research into more relational and 
behavioural aspects of investor activities to explain investor ‘exit’ or voice’.41  
The low level of shareholder activism in the UK is notable, which raises 
questions of the strength of the incentives for UK shareholders to coordinate and 
exercise their shareholder powers, particularly directly intervening in company 
management, even in the presence of a shareholder-friendly set of governance rules.42  
Schäfer and von Arx note that such disengagement can be explained by the largely 
dispersed share ownership of pension funds and free rider problems.43 Tilba, et. al. 
also found that the vast majority of UK pension funds are disengaged owners who 
                                                 
40 For a review of recent literature about pension fund engagement and disengagement see Tilba. A. and 
Wilson, J.F. (2017). Vocabularies of Motive and Temporal Perspectives: Examples of Pension Fund 
Engagement and Disengagement.  British Journal of Management, 28(3), 2-3.   
41 M. Goranova and L. Ryan, ‘Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary Review’ (2014) 40 Journal of 
Management, 5, 1230-1268; T. McNulty and D. Nordberg, ‘Ownership, Activism and Engagement:  
Institutional Investors as Active Owners’ (2016) 24 Corporate Governance: An International Review’ 
3, 335.  
42 Davies, P. (2015). Shareholders in the United Kingdom. ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, nr. 
280/2015, 2.   
43 A. Schäfer and U. von Arx, ‘The Influence of Pension Funds on Corporate Governance’ (2014) 46 




focus primarily on investment return generation at the expense of corporate 
governance considerations.44   
The existing empirical studies cast doubt on the applicability of the 
Stewardship Code. Moreover, a number of academics have begun to articulate 
concerns about the ability of the Code to encourage ‘engaged ownership’ by 
institutional investors. For example, Cheffins argues that it is unlikely that the 
Stewardship Code will be able to foster substantially greater shareholder involvement 
in UK corporate governance due to sustained fragmentation of share ownership 
occurring over recent decades.45  Arsalidou argues that behavioural economics casts 
doubts on the capacity of institutional investors to act rationally and in accordance 
with these ideas, challenging the assumption that the Code will succeed.46 Reisberg 
goes further and suggests that the Stewardship Code is ‘trivial, absent of meaning ad 
incapable of achieving its goals’47 because pension fund trustees demonstrate a kind 
of rational (or irrational) reticence when it comes to stewardship and engagement.  
                                                 
44 Tilba, A and McNulty, T. (2013). Engaged versus Disengaged Ownership: The Case of Pension 
Funds in the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21, p. Tilba. A. and Wilson, J.F. 
(2017). Vocabularies of Motive and Temporal Perspectives: Examples of Pension Fund Engagement 
and Disengagement.  British Journal of Management, 28(3), 7.  
45 B. Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code's Achilles' Heel’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review, 1004.  
46 D. Arsalidou, ‘Institutional Investors, behavioural economics and the concept of Stewardship’ (2012) 
6 Law and Financial Market Review 6, 415.  
47 Reisberg, 'The UK stewardship code: On the road to nowhere?' (2015) 2 Journal of Corporate Law 




Clearly, limited research on pension fund governance focuses on the types of 
pension fund engagement activities as variables, relating them to specific outcomes at 
the expense of shedding light on the motivations that underpin such behaviour. 
Therefore, it is now crucial to have a broader awareness of trustees’ understanding of 
a purpose of a pension scheme and their duties in relation to that trust. 
PENSION FUND GOVERNANCE AND ORGANISATIONAL ETHOS  
There are only a few studies that identify weaknesses and flaws in the pension 
funds’ own governance and accountability mechanisms, as a contributory factor in the 
investor’s failure to exercise the desired shareowner stewardship. For example, the 
lack of investment expertise on trustee boards 48 , pension fund size 49  , and the 
influence of strong-willed and/or more experienced board members or the CEOs of 
the corporate sponsor who may prioritise the interests of the corporate sponsor above 
                                                 
48 Myners Review, (2001); G.Clark, E. Carlewy-Smith, and J. Marshall, ‘The Consistency of UK 
Pension Fund Trustee Decision-Making’ (2007) 6 Journal of Pension Economic and Finance 1,  
67; G. Clark, and R. Urwin, ‘Leadership, Collective Decision-Making, and Pension Fund Governance’  
(2008) available at:, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133015   [(last visited 15  
Aprl 2018)]. Tilba, A and McNulty, T. (2013). Engaged versus Disengaged Ownership: The Case of 
Pension Funds in the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21, 173-174.  
49 T. Noe, ‘Investor Activism and Financial Market Structure’ (2002) 15 Review of Financial Studies 1,  
289; R. Dharwadkar,  M. Goranova,  P. Brandes, and R. Khan, ‘Institutional Ownership and  
Monitoring Effectiveness: It’s Not Just How Much but What Else You Own’ (2008)  19 Organization  




all else.50 These studies, however, provide limited explanations of what motivates 
shareholder behaviour.  For example, Aguilera, et. al. find that some institutional 
investors in the UK have significantly increased the level of involvement with their 
investee companies, putting forward instrumental (self-driven), relational (group-
oriented and legitimising) and moral (appropriate behaviour) motives exemplifying 
the Corporate Social Reasonability (CSR) activities of the UK’s Universities 
Superannuation Scheme (USS). 51  Lindenberg and Steg also distinguish between 
altruistic, biospheric (i.e. environmental and societal) values and egotistic values, 
which can influence pro-social behaviour within organisation.52    
 An important conclusion of Hendry, et al. is that institutional investors see 
themselves not as active ‘owners’, but primarily as financial ‘traders’ who happen to 
control key resources as a result of their trading and whose interests are divorced from 
those of long-term share ownership. 53  Similarly, Bengtsson draws links between 
institutional values and investment behaviour by highlighting that the involvement of 
institutional investors in corporate governance is not only influenced by law and 
regulation, but also by moral and societal obligations, as well as relational ties, which 
                                                 
50 J. Cocco, and P. Volpin, ‘Corporate Governance of Pension Plans: the U.K. evidence’ (2007) 63 
Financial Analysts Journal 1, 70.  
  
51 R. Aguilera, C. Williams, J. Conley, and D. Rupp, ‘Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility:  
a comparative analysis of the UK and the US’ (2006) 14 Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 3, 147.  
52 S. Lindenberg and L. Steg, ‘Normative, gain and hedonic goal frames guiding environmental 
behaviour’ (2007) 63 Journal of Social Issues 117.  
53 J. Hendry, P. Sanderson, R. Barker, and J. Roberts ‘Responsible Ownership, Shareholder Value and 




seem to be attached to the overall ‘ethos’ or a purpose of an organisation.54  More 
recently, Ormiston, et. al. suggest that investor’s expectations regarding risk, return 
and impact vary according to their organisational intentions, noting that ‘financial 
first’ investors tend to include banks, pension funds, wealth funds and finance 
institutions that seek market-competitive financial returns on their investments. 55
 Organisational ethos can be defined as –‘the distinguishing character, 
sentiment, moral nature or guiding beliefs of a person, group or institution’56. Ethos 
may represent organisational values such as sustainability, growth or customer focus, 
which can, in turn, either fit or clash with wider values associated with, for example, 
the political beliefs or personal values of the people who work outside and inside 
organisation, be it executives, board directors, academics, or the policy-makers within 
the wider arena that an organisation operates in. The values of stakeholders (for 
example, current and future retirees of pension fund and the owners, employees and 
sponsors) can influence the values and ethos of the pension fund through 
governance.57          
 In the UK pension funds, organisational ethos is associated with the overall 
purpose to provide retirement benefits to its members at costs acceptable to the 
                                                 
54 E. Bengtsson, ‘Organizational approaches to corporate governance: an empirical study on 
shareholder activism’ (2007) 3 International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 3, 238.  
55 J. Ormiston, K. Charlton, S. Donald, and R. Seymour, ‘Overcoming the Challenges of Impact 
Investing: Insights from Leading Investors’ (2015) 6 Journal of Social Entrepreneurship 3, 352.   
56 Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 1994.   
57 R. Sievänen, R. Hannu, and B. Scholters, ‘European Pension Funds and Sustainable Development:  




employer58. Trustees’ duties in relation to the fund are to act prudently, honestly and 
in the best interest of the members.59  However, the literature about engaged and 
disengaged behaviour of pensions funds suggests that some pension fund trustees may 
understand differently what is the ultimate purpose of the trust and that may shape 
their subsequent approach to stewardship and engagement with portfolio firms. For 
example, in a most recent quantitative study into European Pension funds trade-offs 
between finance and responsibility Siavänen, et. al. find that there is a difference in 
organisational values that pension funds exhibit.60 The authors relate altruistic values 
to the pension fund responsibility which means that a pension fund considers ESG 
issues as well as good governance practices. In contrast, an appreciation of financial 
performance is related to egotistic values.      
 In the context of the UK, Tilba and Wilson provide evidence to suggest that 
engagement or disengagement of pension funds may be a product of trustee rhetoric, 
often constructed in unnoticed ways through the choice of internal and external, often 
irrational, explanations and justifications of their behaviour.61 What remains unclear 
                                                 
58 It should be noted that this is not a “one size fits” all situation as some large pension funds have 
“professional”/corporate trustees while other smaller DB funds have worker/employee trustees who 
clearly have less awareness of the role and responsibilities of the trustee. 
59 The Pensions Regulator (2010). The Trustee Toolkit, available at: 
http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/trustees.aspx  (last visited 15 Aprl 2018).   
60 Sievänen, R., Hannu, R. and Scholters. B. (2017). European Pension Funds and Sustainable 
Development: Trade-Offs between Finance and Responsibility. Business Strategy and the Environment, 
26, 922.  
61 Tilba. A. and Wilson, J.F. (2017). Vocabularies of Motive and Temporal Perspectives: Examples of 




is what organisational ethos is associated with pension funds’ approach to engaging 
with corporations. Questions about the nature of the pensions’ trustee’s duties and 
obligations come to the fore. 
PENSION FUNDS AND FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Pension fund trustees owe certain legal duties to their members, which is 
currently interpreted as a greater stewardship role towards the firms in which they are 
invested62. However, is it unclear if this normative prescription holds any promise for 
a change in investment behaviour towards stewardship because tool.63 The uncertainty 
associated with fiduciary duty is also evident form the on-going reviews of the roles 
of financial intermediaries in relation to ESG meaning only below for the first time 
issues conducted by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 64  the United Nations 
                                                 
62 The Kay Review (2012). The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making. 
[available at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/k/12-631-kay-review-of-equity-
markets-interim-report.pdf ] 65.  
63 Sandberg, J. (2013). (Re-)Interpreting Fiduciary Duty to Justify Socially Responsible Investment for 
Pension Funds. Corporate Governance: An International Review 21(5), 436.   
64 Known as the Freshfields Report, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer A legal Framework for the 
Integration of Environmental, Social and Governance Issues into Institutional Investment. Report 
produced for UNEP FI (2005) available at: http://uksif.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/FRESHFIELDSBRUCKHAUS-DERINGER-2005.-A-legal-framework-for-
the-integration-of-the-EnvironmentalSocial-and-Governance-issues-into-institutional-investment-




Environment Programme Finance Initiative,65 and the Law Commission.66 There is a 
case to be made that the explanation of differences in approach to equity ownership, 
stewardship and engagement lies in the different meanings and interpretations that 
pension fund trustees assign to their fiduciary duties.   
The best starting point in explaining these duties is to look at pension 
legislation and the trust deed. Firstly, it is important to note that the verb ‘fiduciary’ 
means ‘to trust’.67 Indeed, UK pension funds originate from a trust tradition which 
dates back over 800 years. Under trust law pension fund trustees are required to   
manage the assets for the beneficiaries of the trust who could not adequately do so 
themselves68. In other words, the trust is designed to protect ‘the interests of the 
vulnerable’, with others having discretionary power to act on their behalf.69 Thus, 
                                                 
65  UNEP FI, 2009, UNEP Finance Initiative Innovative Financing for Sustainability available at 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/unepfi_overview_2009.pdf (last visited 15 Aprl 2018).  
66 The Law Commission (2013) Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: Initial Questions at: 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/fiduciary-duties-of-investment-intermediaries/ (last visited, 7 April 
2018).   
67 Sandberg, J. (2013). (Re-)Interpreting Fiduciary Duty to Justify Socially Responsible Investment for 
Pension Funds. Corporate Governance: An International Review 21(5), 437.  
68We note here, that one can argue that some beneficiaries have more financial acumen than the 
trustees.  Trust law doesn’t really address the disparity (if it exists) between the superior knowledge of 
the trustees and the relatively vulnerable beneficiaries although this may, in fact, be the case. We keep 
this in mind when ascribing this principle to protecting “the interests of the vulnerable”. 
69 The Law Commission (2013) Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: Initial Questions at: 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/fiduciary-duties-of-investment-intermediaries/ (last visited, 7 April 




fiduciary duty requires ‘the duty of loyalty’ and ‘the duty of care’, with trustees given 
a central role in ensuring their observance.70   
The Duty of Loyalty  
The duty of loyalty is at the core of fiduciary responsibilities, based on the assumption 
that trustees must act in the sole best interests of beneficiaries. This means acting in 
good faith, avoiding conflicts of interest and not deriving personal profit from the 
exercise of fiduciary responsibilities. 71  However, it is unclear what these ‘best 
interests’ are or should be for pension funds,72 as opposed to directors of a company 
who, it is clear, should exercise their powers ‘bona fide in what they consider – not 
what a court may consider – is in the best interests of the company,73 and not for any 
collateral purpose.’74 Similarly, in Dorchester Finance v Stebbing,75 Foster J stated: 
                                                 
70 Ibid, page 5-6.  
71 Fair Pensions, (2011)  The Enlightened Shareholder - Clarifying Investors’ Fiduciary Duties 
available at: https://shareaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/EnlightenedShareholderReport.pdf  
(last visited 15 Aprl 2018).  
72 The Law Commission, (2013), Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: Initial Questions at: 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/fiduciary-duties-of-investment-intermediaries/ (last visited, 7 April 
2018), 15.  
73 The ‘company’ in this context is not usually construed as meaning the company as a detached legal 
entity and the courts look for some humans by which to gauge it. Thus in Gaiman v Association for  
Mental Health [1971] Ch 317, 330 Megarry J said, ‘I would accept the interests of both present and 
future members of the company as a whole, as being a helpful expression of a human equivalent. See 
now the duty to promote the success of the company enshrined in section 172 of the Companies Act, 
2006.   




‘A director must exercise any power vested in him as such, honestly, in good faith and 
in the interests of the company’. In the case of a pension scheme, the task seems not to 
be straightforward: trustees must use their investment powers to earn returns to 
provide a pension. This is best demonstrated by quoting The Pensions Regulator, 
which states that trustees must ensure that pension fund investments deliver value for 
money and good investment outcomes. Accordingly, the interpretation of ‘best 
interests’ often assumes investing in the best financial interests of members.76 The 
focus on ‘financial’ best interest suggests that such interpretations of the fiduciary 
duty may preclude trustees from considering long-term and non-financial factors, a 
conclusion that demands an empirical investigation77 .   
                                                                                                                                             
75 [1989] BCLC 498.  
76 Sandberg, (2013) above n 17, 437. Furthermore in a recent tweet, Alastair Hudson highlights that:  
‘The starting point is the duty of trustees to exercise their powers in the best interests of the present and 
future beneficiaries of the trust. The duty of the trustees towards their beneficiaries is paramount’. 
Megarry J, Cowan v Scargill, a case on a pension fund the best interests of the beneficiaries are 
normally their best financial interests”. In financial regulation, “best interests” is a positive duty on 
professionals: they must achieve them. The best financial interests of USS members are a Defined  
Benefit scheme.  This principle is the legal sun around which all other pensions law moons revolve. The 
trustee must look to the best interests of the members. That does not entitle them to prioritise 
employers’ wishes over members’ best interests’(@ProfAlastair, 7 April 2018).  
77 B. Richardson, ‘From Fiduciary Duties to Fiduciary Relationships for Socially Responsible  
Investing: Responding to the Will of Beneficiaries’ (2011) 1 Journal of Sustainable Finance and  




The Duty of Care   
Although fiduciary duty is legally a different concept from the ‘duty of care78’, in 
fulfilling fiduciary duty , UK pension fund trustees are required to act prudently, 
                                                 
78 Fiduciary duty is legally a different concept to a “duty of care”. Article 1 of the Trustee Act 2000 
provides:  The duty of care. 
(1)Whenever the duty under this subsection applies to a trustee, he must exercise such care and skill as 
is reasonable in the circumstances, having regard in particular—(a)to any special knowledge or 
experience that he has or holds himself out as having, and (b)if he acts as trustee in the course of a 
business or profession, to any special knowledge or experience that it is reasonable to expect of a 
person acting in the course of that kind of business or profession. 
(2)In this Act the duty under subsection (1) is called “the duty of care”. 
Schedule 1 of the Act sets out the basis on which this “duty of care” applies to trustees:  
SCHEDULE 1 
Application of duty of care 
Investment 
1The duty of care applies to a trustee— 
(a)when exercising the general power of investment or any other power of investment, however 
conferred; (b)when carrying out a duty to which he is subject under section 4 or 5 (duties relating to the 
exercise of a power of investment or to the review of investments). 
Agents, nominees and custodians 
3(1)The duty of care applies to a trustee—(a)when entering into arrangements under which a person is 
authorised under section 11 to exercise functions as an agent;(b)when entering into arrangements under 
which a person is appointed under section 16 to act as a nominee;(c)when entering into arrangements 
under which a person is appointed under section 17 or 18 to act as a custodian; (d)when entering into 
arrangements under which, under any other power, however conferred, a person is authorised to 
exercise functions as an agent or is appointed to act as a nominee or custodian; (e)when carrying out 




namely, to exercise the care, diligence and skill that a prudent person of business 
would exercise in managing his or her own affairs.  This is sometimes referred to as 
the ‘prudent man rule’79, which typically implies that trustees should seek advice 
when they make investment decisions if they are not investment experts80 . In short, 
the duty of care guards against carelessness and incompetence81 . The concept of care 
and ‘prudence’ came to be interpreted in terms of having a sensible investment 
strategy for the asset portfolio, emphasizing wealth creation through diversification, 
rather than wealth preservation82 .                                                                                                                                                                       
Another interpretation of the duty of care seems to extend beyond the financial 
growth of the fund to encompass wider environmental, societal and governance 
                                                                                                                                             
(2)For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), entering into arrangements under which a person is 
authorised to exercise functions or is appointed to act as a nominee or custodian includes, in 
particular—(a) selecting the person who is to act,(b)determining any terms on which he is to act, and 
(c)if the person is being authorised to exercise asset management functions, the preparation of a policy 
statement under section 15. 
79 The Law Commission, (2013), Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: Initial Questions at: 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/fiduciary-duties-of-investment-intermediaries/ (last visited, 7 April 
2018), 53.   
80 Sandberg, J. (2013). (Re-)Interpreting Fiduciary Duty to Justify Socially Responsible Investment for 
Pension Funds. Corporate Governance: An International Review 21(5), 438. 
81 The Law Commission, (2013), Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: Initial Questions at: 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/fiduciary-duties-of-investment-intermediaries/ (last visited, 7 April 
2018), 5 






(ESG) issues. This rationale is underpinned by an assumption that if the purpose of a 
pension trust is to provide pensions, then the purpose of a pension fund is to provide a 
decent standard of living for the retired members through considerations of the non-
financial factors within the investment strategy.83      
 Whether the duty of care is compatible with purposefully taking into account 
ESG issues has been the subject of intense debate, particularly in the context of some 
high-profile and large institutional investors such as the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS) and the New York Teachers Retirement System in the 
US, as well as the Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS) in the UK. These 
bodies are taking a lead role in the Socially Responsible Investment and corporate 
engagement movement, on the basis that these activities are compatible with their 
fiduciary duty as trustees84. What remains unclear, however, is whether any of these 
suggestions are plausible for other pension funds. Theoretically and practically we are 
thus left with a question of what is the nature of fiduciary obligation, how it is 
understood and discharged in practice; and what do these observations suggest about 
the nature and a purpose of a pension fund.85  
                                                 
83 Fair Pensions, (2011), The Enlightened Shareholder - Clarifying Investors’ Fiduciary Duties 
[available at: 
http://shareaction.org/sites/default/files/uploaded_files/policy/EnlightenedFiduciaryReport.pdf], 13.  
84 Sandberg, J. (2011). Socially Responsible Investment and Fiduciary Duty: Putting the Freshfields 
Report into Perspective. Journal of Business Ethics 101, 143-162. 
85 The Law Commission, (2013), Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: Initial Questions at: 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/fiduciary-duties-of-investment-intermediaries/ (last visited, 7 April 




Using the data collected as part of a bigger study 86  into pension fund 
investment practices the following section elaborates on the empirical findings from 
35 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with pension fund trustee, executives, 
investment intermediaries and a series of round table discussions with pensions 
experts.  These initial 35 interviews with pension fund trustees, executives, 
investment intermediaries were complemented by a series of meetings and round-
table discussions which took place in London as part of the Law Commission 
Consultation on Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries to which one of the 
authors87 has contributed. The discussions with pensions, legal, investment and policy 
experts, aimed at establishing which factors pension fund trustees consider, or should 
consider, when investing assets on behalf of members. In particular, it was vital to 
inquire whether they should take into account corporate governance or stewardship 
issues, and how far trustees take those issues on board. The discussions resulted in 
further analysis of the interview data for a fine-grained understanding of the interview 
content, particularly relating to the concept of pension fund ‘trust’ and trustee 
‘fiduciary duties’ in relation to investment and stewardship.    
PLURALITY OF FIDUCIARY DUTY INTERPRETATIONS   
One of the key observations this study makes is that pension fund trustees 
interpret their fiduciary duties in a variety of ways. With particular reference to 
engagement, it is possible to draw parallels between their interpretations of fiduciary 
                                                 
86 Tilba, A. (2011). Pension Fund’s Investment Practice and Corporate Engagement. PhD Thesis, 
University of Liverpool Management School, 126; Tilba, A. and McNulty, T. (2013) ‘Engaged versus 
Disengaged Ownership. The Case of Pension Funds in the UK’ Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 21(2): 165-182.  
87 Tilba, A. shared her expertise in pension fund governance, investment management and corporate 
engagement as a member of the Law Commission Advisory Board for the Consultation and the Final 
Report on Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries (2013/2014). The Law Commission Final 




duties and engagement and ultimately how trustees understand the purpose of their 
pension fund.  The findings suggest that approaches to equity ownership and 
stewardship are largely informed by trustees’ interpretations of fiduciary duty, 
resulting in the following observations.    
Firstly, pension funds can be seen as positioned along an analytical spectrum of 
engagement, where some pension fund trustees seek to exert more influence than 
others over investee companies. A predominantly Disengaged approach to equity 
ownership is positioned at the extreme minimalistic end of the spectrum and it is 
associated with pension fund trustees seeing the purpose of the fund is just to pay 
pensions and trustees fiduciary duty of loyalty is therefore to act in the best financial 
interests of the pension fund’s members, which has nothing to do with the 
Stewardship Code assumptions. This approach is contrasted with Corporate 
Engagement at the other extreme of the spectrum. Trustees of more engaged pension 
funds usually interpret their obligations and the purpose of a pension fund in more 
broad terms, i.e. being more active in corporate governance as stewards of invested 
shares. Trustees within this group interpret their duties as extending to broader 
environmental, social and corporate governance issues.  In between the two extreme 
forms in the model are Corporate Employer Engagement and Fund Manager 
Engagement.   
Within Corporate Employer Engagement, the duty of loyalty is broadly 
interpreted to mean acting in the best financial interests, but also meaning that the 
duty of care extends to considering the economic well-being of their sponsoring 
company, prompting engagement in the governance of their employer rather than 




see it as their duty to maximize the investment returns, but also engage with fund 
managers in order to improve corporate governance of their investment portfolio for 
the financial benefit of pension fund members. It appears that the most meaningful 
strategic engagement is rare and frequently happens ‘behind closed doors’, resulting in 
the creation of few records.  
Finally, positioning the data along the analytical spectrum of engagement 
suggests that most pension funds are disengaged, focusing on maximizing their 
investment returns. In this form, pension funds trustees do not have direct contact with 
investee companies, having delegated all to do with investment management and 
corporate engagement to investment managers.   
These main findings help develop the analytical spectrum of pension fund 
engagement presented in Figure 1, which links different interpretations of fiduciary 
duties to forms and methods of engagement. This Figure can be used as a guide and a 
reference point to present and explain the findings, starting first with the majority of 
distant disengaged pension funds.  
  
Figure 1 Stewardship, Fiduciary Duties and the Spectrum of Engagement   
______________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here  
_______________________________  
  
Disengagement   
The overall pattern of pension fund behaviour towards equity investment is 




equity ownership assumes that pension fund trustees delegate88 everything linked to 
associated equity management to their external investment fund managers and focus 
fund manager mandates on investment performance. Out of thirty-five interviews 
undertaken for this study, twenty-two interviews suggest that the majority of pension 
funds do not have direct relationships with their investee companies, nor do they seek 
to influence their fund managers in any way when it comes to corporate governance or 
ESG issues.   
Although pension fund trustees associated with this form of engagement 
consider corporate governance ‘on paper’, a director of a pension fund with nearly £4 
billion of assets under management notes that there is ‘blind delegation’ of these  
responsibilities to external investment fund managers. Moreover, there appears to be 
very limited monitoring and no clear prescription about what engagement policy 
should look like and how it should be effectively communicated to fund managers. In 
practice, involvement either with the investee companies or with fund managers on 
the issues of corporate governance is minimal. The following statement of a current 
investment fund manager (also former pension fund CEO) reflects the lack of trustee 
interest in corporate governance and engagement:    
‘a lot of trustees are still probably paying lip service to the voting 
process and the governance process… a lot of our clients are like 
that…I have been to lots of pension fund trustee meetings and in nine 
out of ten of them trustees never ask questions about corporate 
                                                 
88 Most UK pension funds use a delegated model of investment management. It should be noted here 
that it doesn’t mean that only this explains their disengagement. However, we notice that more engaged 
funds have more in-house investment expertise so they would have a hybrid investment management 





governance. They are interested in our investment performance and 
they want to know what we are doing, what our strategy is, how we 
are allocating money, do we think the market is coming up or down’.  
 
Under their operating mandate, fund managers are responsible for equity management 
and all that is related to corporate governance, mostly understood by pension fund 
interviewees as doing due diligence, research and monitoring, selecting appropriate 
shares if publication is in the UK and voting at company meetings. In this 
arrangement, the fund managers have the flexibility to decide what shares to buy and 
sell, how and when to vote and what methods of engagement are necessary. 
Engagement at this end of the spectrum is largely retrospective and relates to fund 
managers reporting on how they voted. The focus of the investment report relates to 
performance, namely, how the agreed investment benchmarks are met or 
outperformed. All interviews with pension funds in this cluster indicate that the fund 
manager mandate is oriented overwhelmingly to generating returns on investments. 
When the investment performance is poor, or when corporate governance concerns 
arise, fund managers are encouraged to exercise discipline over corporate 
management by selling or trading the shares (exiting), rather than engaging in 
corporate governance (expressing voice). In short, trustees were more concerned with 
the delivery of investment performance, rather than the drivers of that performance 
through stewardship and engagement.   
Significantly, this approach to equity ownership is informed by trustees’ 
understanding of the purpose of the trust and what the trustees’ duties are in relation to 
that trust. Trustees and fund executives consider that pension funds are there to 
provide financial security to members. A trustee’s duty in relation to the trust is to 




of pension fund members. As a trustee of a pension fund with assets under 
management around £2.3 billion explains:   
‘We’ve always taken a view that we’ve got fiduciary duty, which 
is to get the appropriate level of return to meet our liabilities 
going forward, so we don’t take account all those ESG issues, 
we don’t screen on that basis’   
The core duty of loyalty to act in the best interests of pension fund members is broadly 
understood by trustees as acting in the best financial interests, namely, the trustee’s 
role in relation to the trust is to deliver and pay benefits when they fall due to the 
members of the scheme. These interpretations are evident from a majority of trustee 
statements about their role and duties:    
‘Coming back to basics, a trustee has got to act in the members’ 
best interest – that’s just a principal trust law and that’s extended 
in the pension’s law context to say that trustees have got to act in 
the members best financial interest… you’ve got to promise that the 
person will get his final salary on his retirement and that there is 
enough money there, because you promised to pay it’.   
‘We feel as trustees to have a duty to look after the interests of our 
members… and we generally try to do that by maximizing the 
returns relative to the risks that we take’.    
Although a trustee’s duty gives the trustees a fair amount of discretion in making 
investment decisions, provided they do it in good faith and take on appropriate 
investment advice, the common perception is that engagement is simply not 
something that trustees are supposed to be doing89. Trustees were more interested in 
                                                 




the sound standards of administration and other, more generic issues, such as ‘being 
fully funded as soon as possible’ and ‘getting their bloody pension.’90  
Furthermore, spending money on engagement was also considered to be an 
‘unjustified’ use of pension fund resources because of the perceived lack of evidence 
about the ‘immediate benefits’ of engagement. A CEO of an industry-wide pension 
fund with assets under management of £3.4 billion echoes the above statements by 
questioning the benefits of engagement:    
‘We can’t necessarily demonstrate that [engagement] cost would 
lead to a better financial return for our members, so there is a 
conflict because the trustees’ primary role is to look after the best 
financial interests of members. How can we demonstrate that our 
engagement with this company has actually led to a greater 
financial return? Trustees can’t do that, it is very difficult, they are 
open to challenge by members and can be successfully sued 
through the courts for not looking after the members best financial 
interests’.    
                                                 
90 See section 3 of the Trustee Act :3 General power of investment. 
(1)Subject to the provisions of this Part, a trustee may make any kind of investment that he could make 
if he were absolutely entitled to the assets of the trust. 
(2)In this Act the power under subsection (1) is called “the general power of investment”. 
(3)The general power of investment does not permit a trustee to make investments in land other than in 
loans secured on land (but see also section 8). 
(4)A person invests in a loan secured on land if he has rights under any contract under which— 
(a)one person provides another with credit, and 
(b)the obligation of the borrower to repay is secured on land. 
(5) “Credit” includes any cash loan or other financial accommodation. 




It was consequently apparent from many conversations with trustees that 
engagement was not considered to be a prudent way of fulfilling a trustee’s duty of 
care sensibly to grow a pension fund. Interestingly, all trustees within this sample 
considered that they are not qualified, or not the ‘right people’, to engage with the 
investee companies, because the responsibility over investment choices and particular 
styles of management fall within the remit of an external investment fund manager. 
All interviewees considered their investment fund managers to be better suited to 
conduct engagement tasks because the fund managers ‘are the ones whose  
performance depends on those stocks doing well, who research these companies and 
have an in-depth understanding of the business and when intervention is necessary’. 
Therefore, delegation91 is not only a ‘practical issue’, but also a way of avoiding 
putting liability associated with running the investment on trust. As one trustee 
explains:   
‘we are all the time cognisant of the fact that we can’t do too much 
influencing our investment managers because if we do that [A] they 
can’t fulfil their brief, and [B] are we actually starting to take 
responsibility and therefore liability back into the trustee.’   
While reflecting on the role of trustees, several respondents have referred to the 
Pensions Act, which requires them to delegate all day-to-day investment decisions to 
their fund managers92. This also includes any stewardship and engagement activities 
                                                 
91 See comment on authorisation - PERG 10.3. 
92  The Pensions Regulator summarises these obligations as Duties and Powers 






that the fund manager might carry out on behalf of trustees. This, however, is 
preceded by making returns on investment above all within the investment mandate.   
Employer Engagement  
   
Employer Engagement is a peculiar form of engagement because it assumes that 
pension funds can be both distant and involved in corporate governance. On the one 
hand, pension funds have very little interest in how their portfolio companies are 
governed, delegating investment management to external fund managers. At the same 
time, these schemes pay significant attention to governance of their own corporate 
sponsor.   
The relationship with the sponsoring organisation became increasingly 
important as pension fund liabilities are now shown on the employer’s balance sheets.  
The relationship between a pension fund and its employer is important, so much so 
that within one interview 43.3% of the entire content related to the corporate 
sponsor’s role in pension fund investment strategy. Other interviewees have also 
indicated that the issues of governance of the corporate sponsor and its compliance 
with the codes of best practice are important to trustees. In this form of engagement, a 
lot of corporate governance discussions between trustees and the senior managers are 
routine, taking place ‘behind the scenes’, involving dialogue about the overall 
strategic direction of the company, rather than structural governance issues such as 
remuneration or the board structure.   
Involvement with an employer means working towards a better and more 
financially secure future for the company. In turn, this means fulfilling fiduciary duty 
requirements by ensuring a strong and steady flow of pension contributions, which is 




with the corporate sponsor is seen as part of a trustees’ duty of care to secure 
employer’s contributions, and in so doing to grow the fund. Disengagement with 
portfolio companies appears to be the enactment of the duty of loyalty to protect the 
financial interests of the fund members by focusing on investment performance of the 
investment managers, rather than the individual investee firms. As a trustee of one 
industry-wide pension fund with assets under management exceeding £22 billion 
explains:   
‘As a trustee, one of my first and foremost duties is to ensure that 
there are adequate funds to pay the benefits to the members for as 
long as the benefits are due to be paid. In order to achieve that you 
have to look at the strength of the sponsor of the company. One of 
the huge influences on the strength of our sponsor is the fact that 
we’ve got this guarantee of continuing business for the next 25 
years.’   
Interviewees explain that the reputation and the strength of the corporate sponsor, or  
‘employer’s covenant’, is key, particularly when it comes to weighing up the value of 
the pension promise that the employer has made to its members. A Chair of Trustees 
for a pension fund with assets under management exceeding £13 billion explains that 
she considers that her fiduciary duty is not only protecting the interests of the existing 
beneficiaries, but also caring for the scheme’s future beneficiaries ‘by keeping the 
scheme going forward, keeping it open for the new members and looking after 
tomorrow’s members’ interests’, specifically by making sure that the employer 
remains strong. A CEO of a UK top ten pension fund with assets under management 
of over £13 billion explains:   
‘We take our own corporate governance very seriously, the 
independence of the board, the process, the quality are very 
important...understanding the dynamics with the company 
…because it is interdependent, which is the magic glue in the 




She goes on to say that:   
‘Our biggest exposure is the corporate and whatever we do in any 
particular position, it would never have as much influence as us spending 
time with our corporate, making sure that we are getting the right flow of 
money and things are working right. It is a sensible use of time. The trustees 
have limited time, so you put your effort and time into things that make the 
biggest difference and for lots of pension schemes that are attached to the 
corporate, particularly in these difficult times, their attention is 
fundamentally going to be driven by that…. And fundamentally we still have 
got the financial job to do here, that’s what the fiduciary responsibility is 
primarily, so you could not just give into something that you think is a 
really good cause – that’s charity’.   
Engagement with the employer ranged from trustees making ‘petitions’ in  
corridors, discussing corporate governance issues with the management at the trustee 
board meetings, persuading managers to report on their corporate actions, having 
telephone conversations with senior managers over issues such as dividend pay-outs, 
senior executive appointments, remuneration, strategy and investments, share price 
fluctuation, and climate change and other CSR issues. In other words, trustees were 
making sure that the senior managers were running the company ‘in a proper manner 
and through the right processes that are being monitored’. Indeed, in one case a 
pension fund was actually sitting in an employer’s corporate governance department, 
which also included a legal team and senior remuneration team. In some cases trustees 
were even signing confidentiality agreements with the corporation not to disclose the 
entrusted information. Engagement was certainly not happening ‘via the press’. 
Interestingly, interview questions explicitly about trustees influencing and engaging 
with investee companies often caused confusion because the interviewees did not see 
it as their duty to engage, so the answers were quite sceptical and often ironical:   
‘A lot of things from the FSA (now, the FCA) or from the 
government implying that pension funds, as owners of assets, 




better in terms of managing risks. Really? Is that what we are there 
to do? It’s not! I don’t think it is what we are there to do. The 
regulator cannot expect a group of trustees who are doing their 
best to run a pension fund to have better knowledge than them.’   
Just as with disengaged funds, the majority of respondents within this form considered 
themselves as not being in a position to influence ‘other’ companies because the 
shareholdings in individual companies were small and represented only a ‘vehicle for 
delivering revenues’ needed to pay out pensions to members. Interviewees indicate 
that although they have a ‘shareholder activism policy’ within their Statement of 
Investment Principles, it is mostly to ‘tick a box’ as they fully delegate to their 
investment fund managers and ‘almost never’ ask any questions.   
Fund Manager Engagement   
In the case of pension funds, this form of engagement relates not to pension funds’ 
activity vis-à-vis investee corporations directly, but pension funds engaging ‘one level 
down’ - at the fund manager level. Here, pension fund trustees can put pressure on 
their fund managers (through the mandate) to engage with the investee companies on 
a pension fund’s behalf.  
While a fund manager is expected to produce returns on investment, the 
manager is also expected to exercise share ownership rights by voting, using either 
pension fund guidelines or guidelines from other industry organizations, primarily the 
Pension Investment Research Consultants (PIRC) 93  or the Pension and Lifetime 
Savings Association (PLSA)94 95. As shown in Figure 1, predominantly local authority 
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pension funds are associated with this form of engagement, with eight local authorities 
and three occupational pension fund interviews revealing that local authority pension 
funds exert more pressure on their fund managers because they themselves are under 
public scrutiny and demand for greater transparency, particularly when it comes to 
disclosing voting policies.  
The intensity of engagement with investment fund managers ranges from 
simply specifying voting guidelines to actively researching fund managers before 
appointment. Significant attention is spent on researching a fund manager’s voting 
policies and corporate governance activities. The fund managers are encouraged to 
engage with the companies on behalf of pension funds on corporate governance issues 
such as: board structure; director independence; combined roles of CEO and 
Chairman, remuneration, senior appointments, and mergers. In short, it is primarily 
about due diligence.    
Pension fund engagement with the investment fund managers is largely 
informed by how trustees and pensions’ executives interpret their roles and duties. 
Despite the delegated nature of investment management, interviewees within this 
category share a common understanding that their duty in relation to the trust also 
includes stewardship of investee companies. Interviews indicate that in the eyes of 
trustees, pension funds as institutional investors should not only focus on paying out 
pensions, but also act as responsible owners of shares by exerting influence over 
investee corporations through their investment fund managers. Trustees value higher 
standards of corporate governance as a way to safeguard against poor performance, 
believing that more responsible ownership would benefit the scheme’s members in the 
                                                                                                                                             




long-term. A Chief Investment Officer of an occupational pension fund over £5.1 
billion highlights that:  
‘[They] see that it is the job of the trustees to influence the 
managers around taking an interest in the companies and voting 
the shares… so we would have engagement at the manager level 
rather than at stock level’.   
Within this form of engagement, respondents interpret their fiduciary duty of loyalty 
as acting in the best financial interest of the pension fund members by guarding 
against corporate governance failures and by pressuring investment managers to 
engage with portfolio firms. The interviewees also see it as the fund manager’s ‘job’ 
to do so because it is the investment manager who is selecting the stocks and running 
the portfolio on a pension fund’s behalf. A trustee from a local authority pension fund 
(£5 billion) explains:  
 ‘Motivation to engage with the managers was to recognise that 
pension funds were investing a great deal of money and shouldn’t 
be complacent about what is going on in the underlying 
investments. Governance does go to value and you know if a 
company is being properly run according to good standards 
actually that should be in our best interests anyway because 
ultimately it should go to value’.     
   
It is consequently apparent from discussions with trustees about their fiduciary duties 
that by engaging with the investment fund managers, pension fund trustees broadly 
fulfil their duty of loyalty to act in the best financial interests of the pension fund 
members, but ‘stretching’ those interests to include non-financial interests as a means 




Corporate Engagement  
Within this study, only two occupational and local authority pension funds represented 
by the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF) 96  directly engaged with 
investee companies by conducting company research and monitoring, voting and 
proxy voting, writing letters, and holding face-to-face meetings with senior 
management and boards of directors about structural and strategic corporate 
governance issues. These pension funds also invested in specialist corporate 
governance teams in-house or worked with external industry bodies such as PIRC, 
RImetrics or NAPF. In discussing governance issues with senior managers, pension 
fund respondents gave preference to the more subtle and routine conversations 
‘behind the scenes’ and ‘trying to create and maintain long-term relationships with 
the companies’.   
There is a difference between occupational and local authority pension funds as 
regards their preference for direct engagement methods. A small number of extremely 
large pension funds use routine negotiation and occasional outbursts of public 
engagement ‘to make the point’. Local authority pension funds appear to be focusing 
their engagement efforts at direct management control through collaborative 
shareholder resolutions via the LAPFF. For example, at the time of data collection, the 
LAPFF sent 374 letters to investee companies expressing corporate governance 
concerns, as well as engaging with 316 companies on the issues ranging from 
executive remuneration to climate change. Engagement at this level is possible 
because through LAPFF or NAPF these funds have tens of billions of pounds of assets 
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under management and vast internal resources. Collectively, these funds invested over 
£90 billion in UK equities, and in some cases the share-ownership stakes were quite 
substantial, providing access and enabling these funds directly to voice corporate 
governance concerns. Not surprisingly, these funds are atypical in the UK pension 
fund landscape.  
Significantly, the respondents within this group of funds believe that 
stewardship and engagement ‘makes sense’ for two distinct reasons. One underlying 
motivation behind engagement relates to trustees interpreting their fiduciary duty as 
securing the best financial interests of the members where engagement adds value and 
produces better financial returns for the pension fund.  The other relates to trustees’ 
personal values and a sense of altruism and responsibility, which is associated with the 
duty of care. This assumes being a responsible owner of shares, providing not only 
capital but also being concerned with environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
issues for the greater good of society. A more altruistic stance towards engagement is 
more evident in the local authority pension fund context. One of the reasons for such a 
‘concentration’ of responsible investment interests within the public sector pension 
funds could be that local authorities are more pressured to have higher standards of 
public accountability and more is expected of these funds in terms of a public concern 
with ESG issues. These distinctions are explained in the next section.   
Engagement as a Way to Maximize Investment Returns   
All nine interviewees within this group of pension fund trustees justify their approach 
to engagement by claims that it adds value and produces better investment 
performance. Since better investment performance is in the best financial interests of 




Executive Member of LAPFF and a trustee of a pension fund with assets under 
management of over £3 billion highlights that engagement:   
‘…adds value. It is not just altruistic…it is actually good 
business…there is evidence that it does add value to your shares… 
as much as 8% to the company value...It probably adds 20%, which 
is a lot’.    
Notwithstanding the apparent profit-maximising motive, it may be that there 
are other considerations that guide trustees’ decision to be involved in corporate 
governance, namely, trustees’ personal, altruistic values that act in the best long-term 
interests of members, ensuring that the pensions’ benefits could be enjoyed in future.  
These values seem to be arising from the broader interpretation of a trustee’s duty of 
care, which assumes long-term growth of the fund and sustainable pensions for both 
existing and future members.   
Engagement as a Way to Ensure a Sustainable Future    
Only two occupational pension fund trustees advocated this view of equity 
ownership. The more altruistic stance to engagement is more evident within local 
authority pension funds. According to five local authority interviewees, trustees who 
decide to engage with the investee companies are guided by the desire to serve not 
just immediate pension fund members but also for the ‘greater good’ of the public. 
A CEO of one industry-wide pension fund with assets under management of over £3 
billion also notes that there are differences in the drivers of investment strategy 
between local authority and private sector pension funds, where public sector funds 
have a ‘more moral view of things’ running through their investments.  
Another local authority pension fund CEO (£2 billion) expressed a similar opinion:  
 ‘We are a public sector body. In our day-to-day dealings good 




everything we do, so we are applying that rationale to the pension 
fund… we have real high standards of public accountability and we 
just believe that that should run through our investments and if we got 
a chance through that investment to influence – we should be doing it’   
  
Just by virtue of being in the public sector, local authority pension funds appear to 
stand out in their attempts to integrate social responsibility into their investment 
practice. The local authority pension fund trustees ‘feel that they have a duty’ to 
engage with their investee companies due to their political and ideological principles. 
In this case, stewardship and responsible ownership are enactments of duty of care 
within pension funds. In short, engagement ‘makes sense’ and is embedded in the 
investment philosophy and connected to the overall investment decision-making 
process. It is also worth noting here that such interpretations of fiduciary duty were 
causing tension within strategic investment decision-making because as ethical or 
political views were often personal, it was difficult for trustees to justify their choice 
of issues and embedding that within the investment strategy.    
DISCUSSION  
This study contributes to existing governance research in several respects. 
Firstly, it addresses a serious omission in corporate governance research by focusing 
our attention on the governance of significant and distinct types of financial institution 
such as pension funds. Using the lens of investor stewardship, the ultimate goal of this 
paper is to reveal how pension fund trustees interpret the vague concept of ‘fiduciary 
duty’ in their investment practices. More specifically, this paper sheds more light on 
whether trustees’ interpretations of their legal and regulatory duties are, indeed, 
compatible with investor stewardship and engagement, and thus regulators’ 
expectations, particularly in the context of the UK Stewardship Code. The paper also 




current legal guidelines, offering views on the prospects and challenges of stewardship 
and engagement.    
Theoretically, the paper answers calls to disambiguate the concept of 
‘fiduciary duty’97 by developing a multi-layered model which identifies a range of 
interpretations of fiduciary duty and relating them to specific forms and methods of 
pension fund stewardship and corporate engagement. Other scholars and policymakers 
have highlighted this ambiguity but were not able to provide empirically grounded 
explanations for it. 98   Four distinct approaches are revealed within this model: 
Disengagement, Employer Engagement, Fund Manager Engagement and Corporate 
Engagement. This more detailed conceptualisation of pension fund approaches to 
equity ownership underpinned by trustee understanding of their duties allows us to 
explain why some pension funds may seek to exert more influence than others over 
investee companies whilst others remain distant.  
                                                 
97 Sandberg, J. (2011). Socially Responsible Investment and Fiduciary Duty: Putting the Freshfields 
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Through the Spectrum of Engagement (Figure 1) it is possible to demonstrate 
how the intensity of engagement may be linked to how trustees sometimes ‘stretch’99 
the meaning of “fiduciary duty” from the very minimalistic idea of acting solely in the 
best financial interests (focusing on generating investment returns) to considering 
other factors such as the welfare of the employer/employee and other environmental, 
social and governance factors. These findings are particularly interesting given that 
few studies have examined everyday practices of pension funds and offered 
contrasting insights into motivations that underpin their behaviour.100   
This study sheds more light into this conflicting evidence on pension fund 
motivations101 and reveals that the predominant motivation of pension fund utility 
maximization stems from trustees’ interpretation of their duty to act in the best 
financial interests of members. This is achieved through maximizing returns on 
investment and focusing the investment fund managers’ mandates solely on 
generating investment performance. Ormiston, et. al. referred to this as financial first 
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focus.102   In this case, the interests of a pension fund (principals) are not associated 
with the interests of the investee companies. The findings of this paper echo Sievänen 
et. al. who have observed that European pension funds who have not included 
stewardship in their investment strategy have a clear priority regarding their financial 
performance.103  
Furthermore, this study lends further support to Davies104  and Hendry, et al.105 
who note that the majority of pension funds are not ‘real’ owners but detached quasi-
owners with highly diversified portfolios. In this instance, the prevailing ideology that 
shareholders ‘own’ the investee company appears to be a misconception.  The finding 
of predominantly disengaged pension funds lends further support to the academic 
scepticism about the effectiveness of the Stewardship Code in practice.106  
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Nevertheless, we can also see some evidence of pension fund trustees 
behaving like stewards in relation to shares. In the case of pension funds, the findings 
suggest that stewardship behaviour can be explained by the willingness and ability of 
trustees to ‘stretch107’ the meaning of fiduciary duty, from the very minimalistic idea 
of acting solely in the best financial interests by generating investment returns to 
considering other factors such as the welfare of the employer and other environmental, 
social and governance issues. These funds invest similarly to what Siavänen et. al 
describe as altruistic pension funds responsibility,108 which assumes investing also in 
ESG issues as well as good governance practices. This approach is broadly consistent 
with the interim Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) proposals to legislate 
stewardship activities for trustees109 
However, only a few occupational and predominantly local authority pension 
funds in the UK exhibited such an approach to equity ownership, which suggests that 
there may be widespread misconceptions about the nature of the obligations amongst 
pension fund trustees, something which is not helpful in realising the aspirations of 
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investor stewardship and engagement. 110  These misconceptions are particularly 
worrying because they may be perpetuated over time within pension fund investment 
practices through embedded organisational discourse, as Tilba and Wilson suggest.111  
Furthermore, if the pension fund does not invest in the employer company, there is 
presumably no duty for any stewardship under the Code, as no shares are held.  
The findings of this paper also have implications for our understanding of 
accountability relationships between pension funds, pension fund trustees and their 
investee corporations. This study finds that the lines of accountability between 
pension fund trustees and their investee companies are loose and confused. This is 
something Hendry, et. al. have observed, but did not explain.112  As an ambiguous and 
flexible concept ‘fiduciary duty’ seems to give trustees a ‘curtain’ behind which to 
hide when stewardship is concerned. In theory, trustees and pension fund executives 
have the discretion to decide what ESG investments or stewardship activities are in 
the best interests of pension fund members. On the other hand, in practice there may 
always be an ‘alternative’ view or solutions to how the same duty can apply. 
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Therefore, it is possible for trustees to choose the simplest solution, which is to do 
nothing and delegate engagement to the investment fund managers. This raises 
questions about the relevance of a stewardship perspective as applied to the specific 
case of pension funds. Jay Youngdahl calls this an ‘ethical disconnect’. 113 
Theoretically, we thus illuminate contemporary manifestations of the Kantian 
dilemma, namely, how to prevent a possible abuse of self-regulation without 
undermining self-regulation itself. As the relational paradigm in contract and trust law 
is increasingly being eclipsed by the reality of intermediary domination in defining 
investors’ nature of participation and as the funds’ corporate governance positions are 
determined by asset management funds, not their savers or their trustees, our findings 
of the interpretations of the pension fund trustee duties become even more significant 
for the current policy debates.    
POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
This paper highlights significant challenges of using ‘fiduciary duty’ as a tool 
of governance in light of the ongoing governmental reviews of instructional codes of 
best practice. 114  The Stewardship Code and the subsequent 2012 Kay Review 
highlighted the excessive focus on the short-termist investment strategies in UK 
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equity markets, arguing that this is detrimental to sustainable value creation in British 
companies. The Kay Review sought to address this longstanding concern by 
encouraging investor stewardship and recommending that ‘all participants in the 
equity investment chain should observe fiduciary standards in their relationships with 
their clients and customers’115 Interestingly, and perhaps contradictorily, the findings 
of this study suggest that although stewardship has been put forward as a solution to 
investment short-termism and the lack of ownership by institutional investors, in 
reality a lot of trustees believe that their fiduciary duties are pulling pension funds 
away from the original interests of pension fund members towards considerations of 
investee company interests, which are perceived to be far removed from those of the 
pension fund beneficiaries. The findings of this paper suggest that using the concept 
of ‘fiduciary duty’ as envisaged by the Stewardship Code is problematic for pension 
funds for a number of reasons.   
Firstly, the interpretation of ‘fiduciary’ standards varies significantly from 
fund to fund. The legal concept of fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of pension 
fund beneficiaries gives trustees flexibility in dealing with uncertainty and problems 
in the investment and management of pension fund assets. Such flexibility has 
resulted in marked differences in pension fund trustee understanding of what it 
actually means to act in the ‘best interests’.  The implementation of the concept of 
fiduciary duties in practice seems far removed from the notions of corporate 
stewardship and engagement because the majority of trustees interpret their fiduciary 
responsibilities in a very narrow way as ensuring that pensions are paid by producing 
the best possible monetary returns on investment. Thus, our evidence suggests that 
                                                 




there is a disconnect between the legal definition of fiduciary duties and the 
application of such duties in practice, where some pension fund trustees believe that 
the law precludes them from ‘unjustifiably’ spending pension fund resources on 
engagement and considering non-financial factors.  
Secondly, although the general law concept of fiduciary duty is sufficiently 
flexible to allow ESG concerns to be taken into account,116 it does seem to conflict 
with the regulatory framework within which pension fund trustees operate. Namely, as 
a principle of general law a person acting as a trustee has to act in accordance with the 
terms of the trust117.  This would normally be set out by the settlor (the creator of the 
trust) in the trust deed. Stewardship as a relatively new concept has not been explicitly 
included in the terms of the pension fund trusts. Similarly, Stewardship is not looking 
to create legal obligations on the trustee but to set out ethical guidelines for trustees 
who would have to comply with the terms of the trust under which they act. Some 
trusts118 will also have statutory overlays such as the Trustee Act 2000 or for charities 
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(the Charities Act) and pensions (the Pensions Act). For example, see the Charity 
Commission’s guidance119 or the guidance from a local authority in relation to its 
pension scheme120. From these examples, it is clear that the Stewardship Code is 
guidance and not a legal obligation.  A trustee who had reservations about a particular 
investment decision (remembering that trustees may be personally liable for breaching 
the law in respect of investment decisions) can apply to the courts for a direction as to 
whether it is proper to make that investment or indeed a decision can be challenged in 
some cases by other trustees or the beneficiaries of the trust. 
Thirdly, there is also a matter of delegation. Under the duty of care121 and 
PERG 10.3 trustees delegate the day to day management of the pension scheme 
investments to avoid the need for authorisation under the FSMA122. In this regard, in 
order to be an effective delegation, it can be argued (and our interviewees did argue 
this) that if trustees undertook any active monitoring of investee companies, this might 
bring them within the scope of regulation and potential liability which they clearly did 
not want to be (see Q8 under PERG 10.3, which outlines the type of decision a 
                                                 
119 Charity Commission for England and Wales (2018) Guidance The essential trustee, what you need 
to know, what you need to do.   
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7342
88/CC3_may18.pdf [accessed 30 October, 2018].   
120  Lancashire Council trustee guidance on Fiduciary Duties relating to ethical considerations 
http://council.lancashire.gov.uk/documents/s20901/Fiduciary%20duties%20and%20ethical%20invest
ment%20Appendix%20A.pdf [accessed 30 October 2018].  
121 See our earlier discussion section on the Duty of Care  
122  See PERG 10.3 for occupational pension schemes (OPS) 




pension fund trustee can make without being authorised by the FSMA) 123 . The 
Pension Regulator also provides a summary of trustees’ duties and powers with 
regards to delegation124.  
It is important to clarify that the law does not oblige ‘best interests’ to be 
interpreted solely in terms of financial best interests 125 . A more recent FCA’s 
discussion paper on fiduciary duties provides further clarifications on this matter126.  
                                                 
123 PERG 10.3 Pension Scheme Trustees https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/PERG/10/3.html 
[accessed 30 October 2018]. For example, trustees ‘…can make: strategic decisions, such as decisions: 
about the adoption or revision of a statement of investment principles as required by relevant pensions 
legislation; or about the formulation of a general asset allocation policy; or about prescribing the 
method and frequency for rebalancing asset classes, and the permitted ranges of divergence, following 
the setting of the general asset allocation policy; or about the proportion of the assets that should 
constitute investments of particular kinds; or affecting the balance between income and growth; or 
about the appointment of fund managers; or as to which pooled investment products to make available 
for members to choose from under a money purchase scheme’ 
124 According to The Pensions Regulator; ‘Where the trust deed and rules allow you to delegate a 
power and you do so, you remain accountable for the actions taken. However, where you have 
delegated responsibility for investment decisions, your liabilities are generally more restricted. This is 
as long as you can show that you and the other trustees took appropriate steps to satisfy yourselves of 
the matters set out above’.  http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/trustees/role-trustee.aspx (accessed 
30 October 2018). 
125 See Fair Pensions, (2011), The Enlightened Shareholder - Clarifying Investors’ Fiduciary Duties 
[available at: 
http://shareaction.org/sites/default/files/uploaded_files/policy/EnlightenedFiduciaryReport.pdf], p. 18; 
See also Section 5.76 of The Law Commission Final Report on Fiduciary Duties of Investment 
Intermediaries (2014) [https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-




Notwithstanding these ongoing clarifications, the current trustee perception 
seems to be that the common law fiduciary duties override any duty that trustees may 
have to comply with the Stewardship Code requirements. If that is the case, extending 
pension fund trustees’ responsibilities to monitoring how their fund managers carry 
out their investment duties and how investee companies comply with proper standards 
of corporate behaviour can presumably only be pursued if the Stewardship Code is 
                                                                                                                                             
20 of the DWP Consultation on clarifying and strengthening trustees investment duties (July, 2018) 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7169
49/consultation-clarifying-and-strengthening-trustees-investment-duties.pdf (accessed 30 October 
2018). For example: ‘“20.Our proposed Regulations are intended to reassure trustees that they can (and 
indeed should): 
• take account of financially material risks, whether these stem from investee firms’ traditional 
financial reporting, or from broader risks covered in nonfinancial reporting or elsewhere; 
• fulfill the responsibilities associated with holding the investments in members’ best interests – 
whether directly or by others on their behalf – not just through voting, but the full range of stewardship 
activities, such as monitoring, engagement and sponsoring or co-sponsoring shareholder 
resolutions; 
• have an agreed approach on the extent, if at all, to which they will take account of members’ 
concerns, not only about financially material risks such as ESG, including climate change, but the 
scheme’s investment strategy as a whole; and 
• use the SIP as a real, effective and regularly-reviewed guide to investment strategy and not as a 
generic ‘box-ticking’ document.” 
126 See FCA Discussion Paper 18/5, annex 1 for a summary of their understanding of the position 
(https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dp-18-05.pdf) FCA distinguishes between the legal 
model of “duty of care” and a regulatory one based on the FCA Principles for Business and, 
presumably, on the SMCR for individuals. There are also a number of FCA rules that contain an 




recognised by the FCA and the Pensions Regulator. The FCA has reopened the “Duty 
of Care” and fiduciary issue with a discussion paper.127  
It becomes apparent that from a legal standpoint, the question of Stewardship 
and its compatibility with ‘fiduciary duty’ should be a question of the legal status of 
the Stewardship Code itself – currently it isn’t law, it isn’t regulation, it isn’t judge-
made law, therefore it doesn’t get “recognised” and therefore binding.  Under FSMA 
there is provision for the recognition of industry codes but as yet the FCA has not 
recognised any.128 Fiduciary duty and the associated ‘duty of care’ are implicit in the 
existing regulations, but do not seem to being monitored or implemented by the FCA. 
What is required here is much more clarity around the existing FCA rules and when 
the FCA will act if those rules are not followed.  Also, clear explanation about the 
consequences of any action both for the consumer and the firm involved should be 
provided. For example, clear explanation of the circumstances in which action will 
(not ‘might’) be taken by the FCA. Furthermore, a removal of the FCA’s numerous 
get out clauses and words such as ‘may’ or ‘might’ from the regulatory framework 
when it comes to stewardship will be helpful. All in all, there is a need to send the 
                                                 
127  FCA Discussion paper on the Duty of Care and Potential Alternative approaches (2018) 
[https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/discussion-papers/dp18-5-duty-care-and-potential-alternative-
approaches] (accessed 30 October 2018).  
128 https://www.fca.org.uk/about/recognised-industry-codes)  FCA has issued a policy statement in July 
of this year setting out their “approach”   https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/policy-statements/ps18-
18-industry-codes-conduct-discussion-paper-fca-principle-5 and they have set out the process 
https://www.fca.org.uk/about/recognised-industry-codes-criteria-process for getting recognition of such 




right signals at Regulatory level. For the Stewardship Code to have more weight in 
terms of its applicability in practice, it needs to be recognised by the FCA.   
CONCLUSIONS  
This study offers novel empirical evidence, which suggests that the 
relationship between fiduciary duties and Stewardship is ambiguous. This supports the 
academic lack of faith in self-regulation and the ability of the Stewardship Code to 
have a transformative impact on corporate governance. 129  The fuzziness of the 
concept of fiduciary duty, in the context of pension funds, where it means different 
things to trustees; the legal obligations of trusteeship that are imposed on them in their 
capacity of managing pension funds and insurance savings as well as the lack of 
regulatory recognition of the Stewardship Code represent significant barriers to 
pension fund acting as stewards of their investee companies.  
Although it is difficult know whether the Stewardship Code will have or has 
had an effect on how trustees understand the content of their duty, or more generally 
how the Code may change understandings of duties over time, the findings of this 
paper offer further explanations as to why stewardship is proving elusive and raise 
questions about the effectiveness of the Stewardship Code and the nature of 
shareholder activism itself.  The Pensions Regulator and the FCA should publish more 
guidance and more examples of bad practice, and showcase good practice when it 
comes to fiduciary duty and Stewardship.  
                                                 
129 Cheffins, (2010) above n 2; 1004; Arsalidou, above n 12, 415; Reisberg, above n 1, Tilba and 




The findings of this paper suggest that there is a need to educate trustees and 
clarify in law that broader considerations than simply financial may fall within the 
scope of fiduciary duties. An important first step towards this goal has been taken by 
the Law Commission in its Final Report on Fiduciary Duties of Investment 
Intermediaries.  Furthermore, there is a need to design appropriate monitoring for the 
implementation of these mandates.  The current investment mandates are ‘off the 
shelf’ solutions that investment consultants offer to trustees. These investment 
mandates are developed based on the economies of scale, which may not necessarily 
reflect the individual needs of a pension fund.  In order for the mandate to deliver 
what is actually required for that particular pension fund, the trustees need to be 
absolutely sure that this mandate is able to deliver. We then need to decide how do we 
define ‘value’ and ‘value creation’ and what does the delivery of this value 
proposition look like. There is also a need for a decompartmentalisation of ESG 
factors, which need to be integrated into the investment process throughout, rather 
than a separate ‘add on’ function in a separate department.  
Another possible way forward for stewardship is pension fund engagement 
with their investment fund managers, rather than directly with their investee 
corporations. The willingness and ability of some trustees to ‘stretch’ the meaning of 
fiduciary duty beyond maximizing returns over short-term by either engaging with 
companies directly or influencing their investment fund seems more realistic in terms 
of fulfilling the aspirations for shareowner stewardship envisaged by The Stewardship 
Code. To achieve this, there needs to be more clarity concerning the connection 
between fiduciary duty on the one hand and long term and responsible ownership by 
investors on the other. The Investor Forum, which has been created by industry 




rectifying mechanism in safeguarding the interests of asset owners, asset managers 
and corporations. Here, however, it should be noted that because of coordination and 
interests problems it has not showed willingness to do so.   
Figure 1 The Spectrum of Engagement: Stewardship and Fiduciary Duties  
 
 
  
